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Abstract 
This article explores the normative politics of national belonging through an 
analysis of the ‘China Dream’ and the ‘American Dream’. It traces how politicians 
and public intellectuals employ such slogans to highlight how national dreams 
emerge in times of crisis, and involve a combination of aspirations and anxieties. 
It compares parallel rhetorical strategies—‘patriotic worrying’ in China and the 
American Jeremiad in the US—to examine how belonging to these two nations 
involves a nostalgic longing for the past as a model for the future. Debates about 
the meaning of these national dreams highlight the tension between freedom and 
equality in the US, between the individual and the collective in China, and 
between longing for the true nation, and belonging in the actual nation for both 
countries. It concludes that while this quest for redemption through past models 
limits opportunities for critical discourse in China, the American Dream still 
contains much ‘promise’. The China Dream and the American Dream thus are, at 
the same time, 1) familiar expressions of nationalism and national belonging, and 
2) ongoing self/Other coherence-producing performances that help us to 
question received notions of nationalism and national belonging. 
Key words: China, America, dreaming, nostalgia, critical theory 
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Dreaming as a Critical Discourse of National Belonging:  
China Dream, American Dream, and World Dream 
 
The rise of China has complicated the way we think about global politics. In 
2015, Beijing challenged the Western-led world order first diplomatically through 
institution-building, and then militarily through island-building: Beijing launched 
the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, a new multilateral institution that 
challenges the World Bank, and then built military bases on top of coral reefs in 
the South China Sea to challenge neighboring countries and the US (French 
2015; Callahan 2016). 
 It is easy to understand institution-building and island-building in terms of 
materialist international relations theories: liberal institutionalism and offensive 
realism (Ikenberry 2012; Mearsheimer 2014). What is often missing from 
discussions of the rise of China is the ideational challenge posed by Beijing: how 
does the rise of nationalism, and identity politics more broadly, shape domestic 
and international politics in China? Since the end of the Cold War, there has 
been a shift from grand ideologies that universally apply to ‘humanity’—such as 
communism—to ideas and identities that are more local, national, and regional. 
Indeed, often we don’t talk about ‘liberal democracy’ as an ideology available to 
all, but analyze comparative and international politics in terms ‘Western 
democracy’ that may not apply to other regions. Huntington’s (1996) vision of 
world politics as a ‘clash of civilizations’ is an example of this trend, where 
identity takes shape in relation to ‘difference’. Following the critique of 
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cosmopolitan universals seen in the epigraph of Knott’s ‘Introduction’ to this 
section on ‘Nationalism and Belonging’—‘But of course not everyone belongs’ 
(Spiro 2007: 3)—identity politics here defines the self against the Other in order 
to narrate the nation (see Connolly 1991: 64; Bhabha 1990). The rise of 
nationalism in China—against some negative idealization of the West/America—
has been an important part of this oppositional trajectory of national belonging.  
Hence most analyses frame the rise of China in terms of a challenge to the 
West, where Beijing replaces Washington as the capital of the world, and China’s 
harmonious civilizational values replace Western democratic values (Jacques 
2009; Kang 2007; Katzenstein 2012; Rozman 2013). This article takes a different 
track to compare parallel nationalist discourses in China and the United States: 
the China Dream and the American Dream. Following the ‘Nationalism & 
Belonging’ focus of ASEN’s 2014 annual conference, this paper will examine how 
belonging in China and the US involves a nostalgic longing for the past as a 
model for the future. Rather than take identity and membership for granted as 
fixed or stable entities, the article examines how national belonging is the product 
of very active and ongoing political and moral debates among political leaders, 
popular culture, and public intellectuals. It will show how the national belonging 
evoked in these two national dreams can lead to the socialization of ideals, and 
thus to a belonging that is constrained by the nation. It also highlights how 
national dreams can invoke belonging beyond domestic space: both the China 
Dream and the American Dream have active constituencies far beyond their 
national territories—and not just among expatriate or diaspora communities. 
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Rather than taking the ‘nation’ for granted as an essential identity or an 
actor in a rational calculus, it is helpful to see the nation as a set of unstable 
social relations that take on coherence through cultural governance (Shapiro 
2004). Cultural governance here looks to Foucault’s (1991) understanding of 
power as a productive force that is generated by social relationships, rather than 
as a set of juridical practices that restrict action. Shapiro (2004:34) argues that 
while for the early-modern state, sovereignty relied on ‘military and fiscal 
initiatives’, by the nineteenth century these ‘coercive and economic aspects of 
control have been supplemented by a progressively intense cultural governance 
… aimed at making territorial and national/cultural boundaries coextensive.’ But 
Shapiro (2004:49) does not simply chart out the productive power of state-led 
cultural governance; his critical approach also shows how resistance to restrictive 
national identity can emerge through other modalities of expression—film, 
theater, television, novels and other counter-nationalist or alternative-nationalist 
narratives—that ‘challenge the state’s coherence-producing writing 
performances.’ 
Rather than enter into the grand debate about whether nationalism 
precedes nations (or not) (see Gellner 1982, Smith 1986a, Armstrong 1982), I 
would like to explore the contingencies of national belonging by employing a set 
of concepts, rather than arguing in terms of a set of ideologies. Here I follow 
Anderson (1991: 5), who suggests that it would ‘make things easier if one treated 
[nationalism] as if it belonged with “kinship” and “religion,” rather than with 
“liberalism” or “fascism”.’ But rather than looking to nationalism studies’ 
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established list of concepts—language, kinship, religion, and geography, for 
example (see Renan 1990)—I am interested to see how more modest 
concepts—the ‘American Jeremiad’ and ‘patriotic worrying’ [youhuan yishi]—can 
help explain national belonging as a coherence-producing performance in the US 
and China (more below). This follows from interesting work done on the power of 
affect and emotion on national identity construction, especially the role of 
nostalgia in national belonging (see Muro 2005; Armstrong 1982; Smith 2015; 
Murphy 2009).  
By framing analysis in terms of a suspicion of grand narratives (i.e. 
nationalism as ideology), self/Other relations, and the contingent dynamic of 
cultural governance/resistance, this study employs a poststructuralist approach 
to the normative politics of national belonging. Rather than measuring 
‘nationalism’ through public opinion survey research, it seeks to interpret identity 
politics through discourse analysis. It focuses on texts by political leaders not 
because they are ‘true’, but because they are influential. While as commander-in-
chief the US president wields considerable hard power, presidential discourse is 
explored in this article because of the soft power value of the White House as a 
‘bully pulpit’. The discursive power of the Chinese president is even stronger (see 
Brady 2008). Likewise, the article looks to popular culture—the China Idol singing 
contest, for example—not because it reflects true identity or opinion, but because 
it is wildly popular in terms of viewership and commentary. Chinese people are 
buying into the China Dream by consuming nationalism in particular ways (see 
Callahan 2010). Public intellectuals hence are interesting because they mediate 
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between the official power of the state (i.e. presidential speeches) and the 
informal power of popular culture (i.e. television shows): in China, public 
intellectuals are important because they are close advisors to the party-state, 
while at the same time drumming up support for their ideas in online media and 
television talk shows (see Callahan 2013). Hence, this article chooses texts not 
according to their content (i.e. interesting ideas), but according to their popularity 
in official and popular arenas. In this way, what we might otherwise dismiss as 
‘propaganda’, now becomes meaningful information that provides a sense of the 
debates that animate the normative politics of national belonging in China (Pieke 
2009; Swaine 2012:1-2). This article thus shifts from an empiricist explanation 
that relies on a truthful representation of the facts, to a poststructuralist 
understanding that relies on persuasive interpretation (Shapiro 2013, pp. 29-30; 
Bryman 2012, pp. 26-32). Indeed, this interpretive approach is how Chinese 
scholars engage with official discourse: they look for patterns in order to add 
meaning to vague official declarations (see Xu and Du 2015).  
Lastly, it might seem odd that I am employing methods developed to study 
Chinese discourse, which is often very vague, repetitious, and unwieldy, to 
analyze the American Dream as well. Since the discourse of ‘exceptionalism’ 
animates normative debates about national belonging in both China and the US 
(more below), it is common for Americanists and Sinologists to analyze their 
topics in isolation. This article deliberately juxtaposes two well-analyzed topics—
nationalism in authoritarian China and democratic America—to trace out 
connections, similarities, and differences. But rather than starting out from the 
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American case, and analyzing China in terms of liberal values and methods, I do 
the opposite: start from the Chinese case, to see what the debates that produced 
the China Dream can tell us about the normative politics of national belonging in 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as in the US.  
 
National Dreams 
The China Dream became very popular after November 2012 because Xi 
Jinping, China’s new leader, invoked it has his defining slogan: the ‘China dream’ 
is for the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ (Zhonggong 2013:3). Right 
away there were many comparisons with the American Dream, which also has a 
presidential pedigree. Barak Obama’s (2004; 2006) two books even have ‘dream’ 
in the title: Dreams From My Father and The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on 
Reclaiming the American Dream. Indeed, Obama’s life itself presents an 
example of the American Dream writ-small: an outsider who gains fame, fortune, 
and status through hard work. 
 Such national expressions of dreams characteristically posit an essential 
national identity, which is often dismissed as propaganda: the ‘myth’ of the 
American Dream (Hodgson 2009; Noble 2007; Owen 2002). Others look to the 
dark side of American history—slavery and militarism—to tell us that the 
American experience is better described as a nightmare (Bacevich 2009; 
Hodgson 2009; Murphy 2009: 136; Nobel 2007). Curiously, many of the critics of 
the American Dream also adopt an essentialized unitary view, where the 
American Dream is either completely true, or completely false; totally virtuous or 
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totally sinful. Many English scholars, in particular, seek to prove that the 
American Dream is false—a myth that is a poor copy of ‘European’ values 
(Hodgson 2009; also see Bercovitch 2012: 9-10). 
But such efforts to ‘disprove’ the American Dream miss the point. A myth is 
not simply a falsehood; as Aristotle told us, a myth is ‘made up of things to 
wonder at’ (cited in Madsen 1995: 227). The American Dream and the China 
Dream thus are not facts to be proven or disproven, but moral narratives that 
express a nation’s aspirations and anxieties in poly-vocal conversations about 
the good life, civilization, and progress (Madsen 1995: 209-10; Murphy 
2009:135). Rather than denouncing or mocking such dreams, as do many 
scholars and public intellectuals, we should take them seriously as a way of 
thinking about how national belonging takes shape through debates about 
values. Attention to such dreams can help us see how nations are an ongoing 
coherence-producing performance that both includes and excludes various 
groups (see Butler 1993). 
As suggested above, the issues here are both theoretical and empirical. 
They are empirical in the sense that we need to conduct a thick description of the 
China Dream (because it is quite recent), and of the American Dream (because it 
is so enduring). Rather than affirming essentialist singular national identities, I will 
argue that dream discourse grows out of vigorous normative debates about 
national belonging. These debates highlight the tension between freedom and 
equality in the US, and between the individual and the collective in China. More 
generally, they highlight the tension between longing for the true nation, and 
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belonging in the actual nation. As we will see, such dreams erupt not merely in 
domestic space: they now are going global in the soft power politics of a 
rewarmed Cold War battle between the China Dream and the American Dream. 
Analyzing the normative politics of national belonging through an 
examination of national dreams is also a theoretical project. The dreams don’t 
merely reflect the reality of a society—they are positioned as interventions to 
redirect debate as part of a critical practice. Rather than empirical measurements 
of truth or falsity, they involve intersubjective political judgments of normative 
values—which often then are repackaged as truth claims about the authentic 
nation (Murphy 2009:132-5). The article thus explores how the American Dream 
grows out of the particular rhetoric of the ‘American Jeremiad’, and how the 
China Dream grows out of the peculiar Chinese practice of ‘patriotic worrying’.  
‘Jeremiad’ comes from the OId Testament, and looks to the story where 
Jeremiah declares ‘Return, O faithless people’ (Jeremiah 3:22) to Jews who had 
abandoned the covenant sworn at Sinai. The American Jeremiad fuses the 
sacred with the secular to argue that the country has problems because it 
likewise has lost its way. To solve the problems America needs to reaffirm its 
covenant to American ideals, especially as outlined in the sacred texts of the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. The American Jeremiad thus 
combines a sacred covenant with a worldly mission, which through the American 
Dream has now become a mission to the world (Bercovitch 2012; 1978; Murphy 
2009:126).  
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In China, ‘patriotic worrying’ [youhuan yishi] presents a similar backward-
looking discourse. This ‘patriotic worrying’ gives intellectuals the moral obligation 
to frame problems and solutions in terms of China’s national and civilizational 
perfection. Intellectuals feel that it is their job to ponder the fate of the nation, and 
to find the correct formula to solve China’s problems. Once the correct formula is 
discovered, then China will be rejuvenated and take its rightful place at the center 
of the world (Davies 2007; Bøckman 1998).  
As we will see, neither the American Dream nor the China Dream are 
simply positive jingoistic celebrations of the nation. Alongside the celebration 
there is always a lamentation about missed opportunities and lost greatness 
(Bercovitch 1978; Murphy 2009). Part of belonging to these national communities 
thus involves an intense longing for past glory (see Muro 2005; Smith 2015). 
Indeed, in 2013 Chinese President Xi Jinping declared that his China Dream was 
for the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’, while Donald Trump’s 2016 
president campaign slogan was ‘Make American Great Again’. National dreams 
thus are not just a celebration of success, but a response to a crisis: political 
crisis, economic crisis, and cultural crisis—which are all framed as a moral crisis. 
The article’s conclusion thus will consider the limits of these two critical 
interventions: rather than Chinese and American Dreams looking forward to a 
pluralistic future, both the American Jeremiad and Chinese ‘patriotic worrying’ 
aim to get their nations back on the straight-and-narrow path that leads to 
national perfection. To put it another way, it will consider how ‘critical’ does not 
necessarily mean progressive. As we will see, values-talk in both China and the 
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US is dominated by broadly conservative ideals: the family, the collective, and 
order. The goal of the national dream is national perfection rather than the 
universal emancipation of humanity. This, once again, shows how the normative 
politics of national belonging differs from cosmopolitan evocations of solidarity 
that prescribe universal belonging. 
 
The China Dream  
On 29 November 2012, China’s new leader Xi Jinping told us that his ‘China 
dream’ is for the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’. He later explained 
that to ‘fulfill the China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, we 
must achieve a rich and powerful country, the revitalization of the nation, and the 
people’s happiness’ (Zhonggong 2013: 3, 5). Although it is easy to dismiss such 
slogans as propaganda, they are crucial in organizing thought and action in 
Chinese politics (Pieke 2009; Swaine 2012:1-2). Famous communist poet Ai 
Qing (1982: 302)—who is now better known as artist-activist Ai Weiwei’s father—
reflected this understanding of language and politics in a poem he wrote for 
Chairman Mao in 1941: ‘The new slogan determines the new political direction’. 
Here we will examine Xi Jinping’s official book about the China Dream 
(Zhonggong 2013) and his later book The Governance of China (Xi 2014a), and 
relate these speeches to how other policymakers and opinion-makers now 
invoke this phrase. 
China Dream discourse is mostly about domestic politics; it asserts a 
certain vision of Chinese national identity, but it is more complex than that. It 
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promotes an unwieldy combination of individual dreams for the good life, and 
collective dreams for a wealthy and powerful nation: including the military dream 
of China overtaking the US as the next superpower (see Liu 2010; Callahan 
2013). Figures 1 and 2, both of which come from Summer 2013, illustrate the 
parameters of China Dream discourse. Figure 1 shows a boy band of 
metrosexual youth singing at the ‘Voice of the China Dream’ television 
programme (which is modeled on ‘American Idol’). They are pursuing individual 
dreams of fame and fortune by hamming it up to the camera as individuals. 
Figure 2 shows seamen lined up on the deck of China’s first aircraft carrier to 
spell out ‘the China dream is a strong military dream’. These butch guys are not 
acting as individuals: we can’t even see their faces. Hence they exemplify the 
collective dream of national strength, especially when compared with the China 
Dream’s internationalist element: the boy-band singers are actually from South 
Korea.  
 
 
Figure 1: ‘Voice of the China Dream’ contest 
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Figure 2: ‘China Dream is Strong Military Dream’ (CCTV 2013) 
 
However, the two figures are not examples of cultural governance and 
resistance: both the ‘Voice of the China Dream’ singing contest and the naval 
operation are part of Beijing’s official propaganda campaign (see Zhonggong 
Beijing 2013; Xinhua 2013). These examples show how the China Dream has 
been recruited into an on-going conversation about Chinese values, and about 
who belongs in the Chinese nation. But it’s more than simply propaganda: when 
Xi introduced the China Dream concept in November 2012, he actually 
recognized that ‘everyone has their own ideals and aspirations, and all have their 
own dream. Now, everyone is talking about the China Dream’ (Zhonggong 2013: 
3). Xi’s China Dream thus is part of a broad and ongoing debate about the moral 
crisis that China faces after three decades of economic reform and opening. In 
other words, China’s New Left, traditionalists, militarists and liberals are all 
worried about the ‘values crisis’ presented by what they call China’s new ‘money-
worship’ society (Hu 2011; Xu 2011; Liu 2010; Yan 2013). Intellectuals from 
across the political spectrum thus have a crisis mentality and engage in what 
Davies (2007:1) describes as ‘patriotic worrying’: 
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Worrying about the problems that prevent China from attaining 
perfection, not only as a nation but also as an enduring civilization, is 
the kind of patriotic sentiment that one commonly encounters in the 
essays of Chinese intellectuals. 
Competing voices in civil society thus invoke the China Dream to respond to this 
values crisis in many different ways (see Callahan 2013; Liu 2010).  
Xi’s invocation of the China Dream in 2012 was his intervention into this 
debate in civil society. This new slogan is meant to determine China’s new 
political direction, and to provide the correct formula that will generate a sense of 
national belonging in China, and will lead to China’s perfection as a nation and as 
a global civilization.  
‘The China Dream, The Dream of Constitutionalism’, the 2013 New 
Year’s editorial of the Southern Weekend newspaper (Nanfang Zhoumo), 
challenged Xi’s narrow vision of China’s future in interesting ways. It used 
the same ‘China Dream’ slogan to call for legal limits on the power of the 
party-state. It argued that the quest for human dignity ‘cannot possibly end 
with national strength alone; it must include self-respect for every person. 
… We will continue to dream until every person, whether high official or 
peddler on the street, can live in dignity’. The editorial thus concluded that 
‘the real “China Dream” is a dream for freedom and constitutional 
government’ (Dai 2013). Unfortunately, this editorial was censored, and 
then rewritten by the provincial propaganda chief to endorse a national 
dream of strong state power.  
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But in another way this invocation of China Dream discourse was an 
effective act of resistance; this state censorship generated considerable 
protest from journalists in China. It then sparked a lively debate in the wider 
public about the rule of law in the PRC, which continued into 2016. Indeed, 
it provoked China’s leadership to make the rule of law the main theme at 
the annual meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) in October 2014. This then is a prime example of how the 
cultural governance of the China Dream can provoke resistance by making 
debates veer off into unpredictable directions. While not leading directly to 
political reform, this constitutional debate certainly made the party-state 
feel the need to publicly defend what it means by the ‘rule of law’ and what 
it means by the ‘China Dream’. 
Xi’s invocation of the China Dream thus is responding to a ‘crisis’ in state 
power that runs parallel to the values crisis in civil society: a crisis of political 
legitimacy in the rapidly changing social situation that is the result of China’s 
rapidly growing economy. Although from the outside China may look confident, 
internally many of its leaders are uneasy; as it fulfills its grand aspirations, China 
simultaneously encounters nagging political, social, and economic uncertainties. 
According to both officials and public intellectuals, China is in an ‘era of strategic 
opportunity’. The stakes are high—if Beijing misses this great opportunity to fulfill 
the China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, then many feel 
that the PRC risks total failure: ‘If China in the twenty-first century cannot become 
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world number one, cannot become the top power, then inevitably it will become a 
straggler that is cast aside’ (Liu 2010: 9).  
Xi thus promotes the China Dream as a ‘composite ideology’ to address a 
wide array of opportunities and risks (Smith 1986b:83ff). It is full of 
contradictions, but that is not necessarily a weakness. As a composite ideology, 
the China Dream it is able to encompass both individual dreams of happiness 
and collective dreams of national strength. Rather than point to socialism as a 
universal ideology that promises liberation, the China Dream looks to what Frank 
Pieke calls ‘neo-socialism’. Since the CCP shifted from being a revolutionary 
party to a ruling party in 2000, there has been much ideological work to legitimate 
continued party rule. As Pieke (2009:11) explains,  
under neo-socialist rule, the communist utopia has been replaced by a 
technocratic objective of a strong, peaceful and modern China that is 
almost synonymous with strong, effective and forward-looking 
government. … Socialist ideology is no longer the end served by the 
Communist Party rule, but the mere means by which party rule is 
perpetuated. 
In this way progressive universal ideologies can be nationalized—as did Deng 
Xiaoping in the early 1980s with ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’. Xi’s 
China Dream thus looks to China’s unique national identity: the China Dream 
mobilizes the Chinese Spirit to follow the Chinese Path (Zhonggong 2013).  
Xi Jinping’s China Dream has coopted the language and arguments of 
many public intellectuals in the military and the New Left. China’s liberals, 
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however, are largely excluded from this new coalition. Individual dreams of an 
economic and social ‘good life’ are encouraged—but as we saw with the debate 
over constitutionalism, dreams of individual political rights and liberties that 
challenge the party-state are discouraged. Belonging in the Chinese nation is 
likewise hierarchical: people who challenge the collective path to the China 
Dream are less favored than those who follow it. 
 
Chinese views of the American Dream 
Many discussions of the China Dream in the PRC actually start with the 
American Dream (Zhou 2011: 2; Liu Yazhou in Liu 2010: 1; Zhao 2006; Brady 
2008: 5; Wang 2013a; Hu 2013a; Shi 2013), which should not be surprising since 
the American Dream is a global discourse. One scholar even stated that only 
great powers like China and the United States ‘dare to have national dreams’ 
(Shi 2013). But the China Dream is usually discussed as a challenge to the 
American Dream. For example, just before Xi Jinping went to the US to meet 
Barak Obama in June 2013, the CCP’s official newspaper the People’s Daily 
explained the ‘Seven Major Differences between the China Dream and the 
American Dream’ in terms of China’s collective dream of national wealth and 
power, and Americans’ dreams of personal freedom and happiness (Shi 2013). 
China here is defined as a nation united in its virtuous pursuit of global power, 
while America is portrayed as a collection of individuals bent on their own selfish 
schemes.  
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Xi Jinping reinforced the Cold War geopolitical framing of the China 
Dream at the ‘Beijing Forum on Art and Literature’ in 2014 when he praised a 
young blogger, Zhou Xiaoping, for spreading ‘positive energy’. Zhou (2013) is 
most famous for his discussion of the China Dream as a rich alternative to what 
he calls the ‘Broken American Dream’. Official commentators thus can conclude 
that the American Dream as a whole is a ‘failure’ because not every single 
American has been able to achieve their individual dream (Xu 2013:127). 
 The point of China Dream policy thus is not only to tell people what they 
can dream, but more importantly, what they cannot dream: many individual 
dreams, the constitutional dream, and the American Dream (Wang 2013b). 
Although he does not point directly at the American Dream, Xi Jinping told 
journalists from BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) that China 
‘can’t follow other countries’ development models’ (Zhonggong 2013: 27). A 
scholar fleshed out this point in the Global Times: ‘We do not dream the dreams 
of other countries, especially not the American Dream. The American model 
causes great harm’, and thus is a bad example for China (Wang 2013a). 
This coherence-producing performance of national belonging aims to 
convince people that Chinese values are not only different from American values, 
but are the opposite: Chinese values are good, while American values are evil 
(Tian 2013). Many commentators, including liberal intellectuals like Hu Shuli, 
argue that China and the United States are involved in a Cold War-style contest 
of the American Dream versus the China dream (Hu Shuli 2013; Hu 2013a; also 
see Yan 2013). The military agrees: ‘Silent Contest’, a documentary film from 
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China’s National Defense University, sees American values as the main 
existential threat to the PRC (Jiaoliang wusheng 2013; Perez 2013). China’s new 
National Security Commission likewise sees ‘Western values’ as the major 
‘unconventional threat’ faced by the PRC (Hayashi 2014). 
 Actually, there are many of examples in China and the United States 
where the two dreams overlap. As the ‘Voice of the China Dream’ contest and 
the ‘Constitutional Dream’ editorial both show, there are many dreams of 
individual success and individual rights in China. There are also many dreams of 
collective freedom and equality in the United States: most famously, Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s ‘I Have a Dream’ speech outlined the American Dream of racial 
and class equality. Even so, Hu Shuli (2013) follows the general trend in the PRC 
to argue that once Beijing has clarified its China Dream, then ‘Chinese diplomacy 
will have found a new lease on life’, and be able to beat America on the global 
stage.  
 
American Dream and American Exceptionalism 
The American Dream certainly is widely invoked as a celebration of unique 
national values. In Dreams from My Father, Obama (2004: 11) tells the story of 
how his Kenyan father charmed a racist by smiling and ‘lectur[ing] him on the 
folly of bigotry, the promise of the American Dream, and the universal rights of 
man.’ The man actually apologized and bought Obama’s father a drink. In The 
Audacity of Hope (2006: 260-1), Obama’s staff kid him about how he 
formulaically uses the ‘American Dream’ in speeches to new immigrants:  
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Section 1: ‘I am your friend’,  
Section 2: ‘[Fill in home country] has been a cradle of civilization’, 
Section 3: ‘You embody the American dream.’ 
But generally, among American intellectuals the dream is discussed as a 
problem to be solved: The Audacity of Hope’s subtitle is ‘Reclaiming the 
American Dream’ (also see Hochschild 1998). 
The American Dream seems simple—the crass materialism of fame and 
fortune—but it actually is quite complex. In his book-length treatment of the 
American Dream, Jim Cullen (2003) explores six interrelated archetypes: 
religious freedom, political freedom, upward mobility, equality, home ownership, 
and fame and fortune. Although people like to trace the American Dream back to 
the Pilgrims, the first citation for it as a guiding theme is quite recent—in 1931, 
James Truslow Adams coined the phrase in his popular history, The Epic of 
America. His century-old description is quite familiar: ‘The American Dream, that 
dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for every man, 
with opportunity for each according to his ability or achievement’ (Adams 
1931:416). A critical view of the American dream is important because, as 
Richard Hofstadter famously stated, ‘It has been our fate as a nation not to have 
ideologies, but to be one’ (cited in Lipset 1996: 18). The American dream thus is 
part of the ideology of Americanism, the American creed, which Abraham Lincoln 
called the ‘political religion of the nation’ (cited in Cullen 2003: 80; also see Rorty 
1998). 
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This national dream also grows out of a crisis situation. The American 
Dream was first mooted not at a time of national prosperity, but at the depths of 
the Great Depression. Like with the China Dream, it is a mixture of aspirations 
and anxieties. It celebrates success, but at the same time is haunted by ‘a sense 
of dissatisfaction, a belief that the nation we inhabit isn’t quite right—but could be’ 
(Cullen 2003:40). Hence it is always a discussion of values: James Truslow 
Adams (1931:416) asks ‘What is better and what is richer?’ He answers: ‘It is not 
a dream of motor cars and high wages merely, but a dream of a social order in 
which each man and each woman shall be able to attain to the fullest stature of 
which they are innately capable….’  
In such discussions of political, economic and cultural values, there is a 
tension between individual freedom and collective equality. Rather than simply 
celebrating the American Dream as a success, Adams’ book shows that from the 
very beginning, it was about ‘reclaiming’ the American Dream. Donald Trump 
thus follows the trend in his formulation of the American Dream: ‘The American 
Dream is dead. But I’m gonna make it bigger and better and stronger than ever 
before. We are going to make America great again’ (cited in Vorhees 2016). 
Although it characteristically informs conservative movements, the 
American Dream can support progressive politics: Richard Rorty (1998:101) 
appealed to the power of dreams for progressive social change when he wrote:  
You have to describe the country in terms of what you passionately 
want it to become, as well as what you know it to be now. You have to 
be loyal to a dream country rather than to the one to which you wake 
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up every morning. Unless such loyalty exists, the ideal has no chance 
of becoming actual. 
According to the liberal narrative of expanding freedom and equality, the 
American Dream informed the civil rights struggles of the 1960s and 1970s that 
led to greater rights and freedoms regardless of race, class, gender and sexuality 
(Murphy 2009:132ff). The Supreme Court’s 2015 decision to celebrate same-sex 
marriage thus is seen by such liberal reformers as the latest victory in this 
ongoing struggle to achieve the American Dream.  
Like Chinese intellectuals, American writers worry that their treasured 
values are at risk. While the Chinese deal with this existential threat through 
‘patriotic worrying’, Americans do it through ‘jeremiads’, the bitter political 
sermons that criticize the moral corruption of society and lament the nation’s 
imminent decline:  
We Americans, the jeremiad proclaims, have failed to live up to our 
founding principles, betrayed our sacred covenant as history’s (or 
God’s) chosen nation, and must rededicate ourselves to our ideals, 
reclaim our founding promise (Stephenson 2010).  
This moral tale thus looks to the past for solutions to the problems of the present 
and future.  
The Jeremiad’s fusion of sacred and secular is a favourite vehicle of the 
religious right in the US. They trace the decline of America to the crisis of family 
values in 1960s, and argue that to reclaim the American Dream the country 
needs to return to its Protestant values and an idealized version of social life from 
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the 1950s (Murphy 2009: 128-30). Although Obama aimed to be post-partisan 
and rise above such Culture Wars, he is well-known for his inspiring rhetoric that 
lays out America’s problems and provides a pathway to reclaim the American 
Dream (see, for example, Obama 2013). This is an example of what Andrew 
Murphy (2009: 132ff) calls a ‘progressive Jeremiad’ that looks to a more open 
and diverse society. Much like Rorty and his dream country, Obama (2006: 233) 
argues that to understand the future we have to view the US through a ‘split 
screen’ in order ‘to maintain in our sights the kind of America that we want while 
looking squarely at America as it is, to acknowledge the sins of our past and the 
challenges of the present without becoming trapped in cynicism or despair’. 
The American Dream has always been part of a global discourse. It was a 
reaction to what are called the ‘Old World’ values of European class society 
(Bercovitch 2012: 6; Murphy 2009; Rorty 1998: 24). The United States here is 
figured as the world’s first new nation, a new utopia: John Winthrop’s (1630) 
sermon ‘A Model of Christian Charity’, which was invoked in key speeches of 
both John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan, preached that America is ‘a city upon 
a hill’ that would be judged not just by God, but also by the world because ‘the 
eyes of all people are upon us.’ Abraham Lincoln’s American dream is not just for 
Americans, because it gives ‘liberty not alone to the people of this country, but 
hope to the world for all future time. It was that which gave promise that in due 
time the weights should be lifted from the shoulders of all men, and that all 
should have an equal chance.’ Lincoln thus concludes that America is ‘the last, 
best hope of earth’ (cited in Cullen 2003, 94, 96). James Truslow Adams agrees: 
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‘The American dream of a better, richer, and happier life for all our citizens of 
every rank which is the greatest contribution we have as yet made to the thought 
and welfare of the world’ (Adams 1931: viii). Numerous other writers have made 
similar arguments, right up until the present (see Rorty 1998; Gingrich 2011; 
Rubio 2013). 
This global American Dream leads us to American exceptionalism, which 
is a very similar discourse to the American Dream where writers commonly use 
the same events, texts, and people to argue for it (see Callahan 2013: 150-6). 
While the American Dream states that the US is unique and superior, American 
Exceptionalism goes further to state that the nation is uniquely superior and the 
best in the world: the chosen nation (Bercovitch 1978; Murphy 2009). Obama 
tried to make American exceptionalism less exclusive during the 2012 
presidential election campaign: ‘I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I 
suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in 
Greek exceptionalism’ (Schlesinger 2011). But this statement just fired up 
America’s right wing to defend America as a uniquely moral nation, with a 
mission to fight for freedom around the world (see Gingrich 2011; Romney 2011).  
Although this discourse flowered during the Cold War, it still continues in 
some quarters. For example, in response to Obama and Xi’s California summit in 
2013, US Senator Marco Rubio used a Cold War-style figuration to talk about 
US-China relations in terms of the American Dream vs. the China Dream. In a 
typical jeremiad, Rubio (2013) tells us that America has lost its way under 
Obama, and needs to ‘return to the right course, get our economy in order, and 
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resume the global leadership required to ensure that the rise of China … occurs 
peacefully’. Rubio assures us that ‘[i]f America does these things’, it will ensure 
that ‘the American Dream continues to be what people everywhere aspire to, for 
decades to come.’  
 
China’s Exceptionalist World Dream 
As noted above, many Chinese commentators argue that the American Dream is 
not just different from the China dream, but is the opposite: China Dream is good 
and the American Dream is evil. After criticizing the American Dream, 
commentators often talk about how China’s national rejuvenation is part of a 
World Dream. As Ma Zhengang (2013), former ambassador to the UK, declared, 
‘China’s Dream is the world’s dream’ (also see Tian 2013; Ren 2013; Zhongguo 
meng 2013; Hu Angang 2013a; 2013b; Zhou 2014). Xi Jinping said similar things 
to foreign audiences, especially in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Zhonggong 
2013: 63-74; Xi 2014a: 315-93). Xi Jinping thus explained that the China dream 
‘not only enriches the Chinese people, but also benefits the people of the world’ 
(Zhonggong 2013: 70, 71). As he elaborates: ‘We should increase China’s soft 
power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China’s message 
to the world’ in order to ‘highlight the global significance of the China dream’ (Xi 
2014c). Realizing the China Dream, thus ‘will lead to the World Dream’ (Wang 
2015: 40). 
This World Dream is an extension of Chinese exceptionalism, a discourse 
that has emerged in the past fifteen years. Traditionally, Chinese identity was 
 26 
defined according to cultural vectors: civilization vs. barbarism. Lien-sheng Yang 
(1968:20) explains that the Sinocentric hierarchy is predicated on ‘China being 
internal, large, and high and barbarians being external, small and low.’ Chinese 
civilization thus was seen as uniquely superior to everything else, and China as 
the natural center of Asia, if not the world.  
The idea of exceptionalism reemerged in neo-socialist China as part of the 
values crisis (Kang 2003; Tatlow 2014). While American exceptionalism grows 
out of the idea that the United States is the world’s first new nation, Chinese 
exceptionalism looks to 5,000 years of uniquely continuous civilization to see 
China as the world’s first ancient civilization (Zhang 2011). While American 
exceptionalists see the United States as a beacon of freedom and democracy, 
Chinese exceptionalists see their country as a peaceful and harmonious 
alternative to American ‘hegemony’. Although historians have provided a 
nuanced analysis of China’s violent imperial history, Chinese intellectuals still 
take for granted the exceptionalist argument of China’s civilization as ‘inherently 
peaceful’ (Zhang 2013; Wang 2011; Zhang 2011; Zhang 2014; Fu 2002). 
This Sinocentric world order is an example of ‘patriotic worrying’ because it 
locates the correct formula for Asia’s future in China’s imperial past. Among 
Chinese public intellectuals there is much talk about the ‘Under-Heaven’ system 
(Tianxia) as the model for the twenty-first century (Zhao 2011). This switches 
from the UN model of an international system of legally equal nation-states to a 
hierarchical tributary system that is centered on Beijing. The goal of the China 
Dream is to restore China’s ‘natural position’ at the center of the world—as it was 
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before the Industrial Revolution. This new interpretation of Confucianism’s 
hierarchical system values order over freedom, ethics over law, and elite 
governance over democracy and human rights (see Zhao 2011).  
Public intellectuals in China are developing this idea to propose a post-
Western version of the China Dream/World Dream, which has China lead the rise 
of the Global South against the West. New Left economist Hu Angang, who is 
influential both as an advisor to the party-state and as a public intellectual, 
predicts a ‘great reversal’ of world order: where the Global South replaces the 
West. In addition to promoting socialist internationalism, Hu likes China’s 
traditional values. For him the World Dream of the twenty-first century is for Great 
Peace for All-under-Heaven (taiping tianxia) and the World of Great Harmony 
(shijie datong) (Hu 2013a; Hu 2013b; Hua 2013). These are very common 
utopian slogans; but they are also highly political, sketching out a world order that 
is hierarchical and Sinocentric (Zhao 2011; Hu 2013b). 
This combination of socialist internationalism and Confucian ideals may 
sound far-fetched, but it fits in with how Xi Jinping (2014a:325-29) described 
China’s new ‘peripheral diplomacy’ policy in October 2013. The new policy mixes 
economic cooperation with joint military exercises; it stresses that Beijing seeks 
to ‘socialize’ regional countries by developing shared beliefs and norms that will 
support the ‘community of shared destiny’ of the Sinocentric regional order. Here 
China sees its rejuvenation as a moral mission to improve the world by spreading 
its ideas, aspirations and norms–starting in Southeast Asia (see Xi 2014a: 325-
29, 389-93; Zhou 2014; Wang 2015).  
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Xi Jinping (2014b) himself expanded on the China Dream strategy when he 
spoke of the Asia-Pacific Dream at the APEC meeting in 2014. This dream is not 
like the ‘Pacific Century’ rhetoric of the 1990s, which used the globalization logic 
to describe the transnational economic and social exchanges that knit together 
nonstate actors along the Pacific Rim (Cumings 1998). Xi’s Asia-Pacific Dream is 
more continental, state-centric and Sinocentric. The Asia-Pacific Dream promises 
to integrate the Eurasian-Pacific region around Beijing through the Belt and Road 
Initiative, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Silk Road Fund (see 
Xi 2014a: 389-93; Fallon 2015).  
The zero-sum security implications of the China Dream/Asia-Pacific Dream 
strategy became apparent in Xi’s speech at the meeting of the Conference on 
Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. Xi (2014a:392) criticized 
Asia’s current security architecture, which is grounded in alliances with the US, to 
state that security problems in Asia should be solved by Asians themselves. This 
was widely understood to be an ‘Asia-for-Asians’ strategy that excludes the US 
(see Tiezzi 2014). It complements Xi’s domestic China Dream campaigns against 
‘Western values’: democracy, civil society, constitutionalism, and so on.  
The way that the China Dream has been expanded into the Asia-Pacific 
Dream and the World Dream shows that the battle over values in the PRC is 
being won by those who promote an exceptionalist view of a ‘China’. The 
normative politics of national belonging here does not simply invoke a nativistic 
version of the Chinese nation; it also looks to belonging to an Asia, and perhaps 
a world, that is informed by a globalization of China’s national values. 
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Conclusion: The Limits of National Dreams 
This article argues that we need to take the China Dream and the American 
Dream seriously not simply as reflections of stable national values (that have 
gone global), but as critical interventions into normative debates about national 
belonging in each country. While it is common to dismiss the American Dream as 
crass materialism, we have seen that it has always been concerned with the 
social values of democracy, freedom and equality. Likewise, the China Dream is 
much more than a propaganda campaign that promotes a singular vision of the 
PRC as a strong state. It also includes many individual and collective dreams 
that look to spiritual values and materialist goals beyond the state. To argue that 
these two dreams of national belonging can be critical interventions, I have used 
the concepts of ‘patriotic worrying’ for China and the ‘American Jeremiad’ for the 
US. These concepts highlight how the normative politics of national belonging 
emerge in times of crisis; national dreams thus involve a combination of 
celebration and lamentation that mixes aspirations and anxieties (see Bercovitch 
1978; Davies 2007). 
While both concepts describe how public intellectuals can and do join 
national debates, it is important to note that both concepts have been criticized 
for limiting the possibility of critical discourse. Sacvan Bercovitch (1978, 2012) is 
famous for describing the American Jeremiad as a curious process of dissent 
that actually produces assent. He criticizes it for limiting American public 
discourse to issues of reclaiming past national values rather than generating new 
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universal utopia. He argues that the end result of the Jeremiad’s harsh critique 
has been the growth and spread of American capitalism. Even progressive 
appeals for greater freedom and equality, like Martin Luther King’s iconic ‘I have 
a dream’ speech, have to reference sacred texts from the past—the Declaration 
of Independence, for example—in order to gain political legitimacy. The 
American Dream for Bercovitch thus has domesticated dissent, and has 
produced an intellectual terrain that lacks diversity. Indeed, at times Bercovitch 
(2012: 11) employs Jeremiah-esque hyperbole: ‘the United States developed into 
a country with less diversity … than any other nation of the West, or perhaps the 
world.’ Here the liberal logic of inclusiveness forecloses radical possibilities. The 
American Jeremiad for Bercovitch is a process of containment, where the future 
is limited by the past in the quest for perfection.  
Gloria Davies has an even more biting critique of contemporary critical 
discourse in China. ‘Patriotic worrying’ here gives Chinese intellectuals the moral 
obligation to frame problems and solutions in terms of China’s national and 
civilizational perfection. Although different thinkers take different approaches, 
they are all united in the deeply normative project of perfecting China. The idea is 
that when worrying intellectuals find the correct theory and method for 
understanding the world’s logic of development, then all of China’s problems will 
be solved, once and for all. Thus critical inquiry in China is both normative and 
positivistic, with a certitude that the Truth is Out There. The moral obligation of 
intellectuals is to discover this Truth, save China from its imperfections, and thus 
reestablish China as the moral center of the world. 
 31 
Theoretically this is problematic: Chinese intellectuals say they are 
employing poststructural and postcolonial approaches that are suspicious of 
metanarratives, but they are actually using a positivist method to find the True 
China in a world of essentialized identities. Davies (2007: 23, 7) points out that 
patriotic worrying’s sharp focus on ‘China’ as the problem means that 
intellectuals rarely frame their considerations in terms of the wider issues of 
humanity. The World Dream thus is just the China Dream writ-large. So like the 
American Jeremiad, patriotic worrying serves to reaffirm backward-looking 
national ideals rather than engage in transnational critique. 
Yet for some political theorists, the American Dream still has some mileage. 
Andrew Murphy (2009) has an interesting analysis of the American Jeremiad that 
acknowledges the political limits of the American Dream, while also suggesting 
more hopeful possibilities. He agrees with Bercovitch that traditional Jeremiads 
are quite formulaic in their appeal to the past as a model for the future, and thus 
serve to constrain political ideals from radical alternatives. In the Tea Party 
movement we can see how people use sacred documents—the Bible, the 
Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution—as ‘a sort of empirical 
checklist to hold up in order to assess the propriety of certain features of 
contemporary life’ (Murphy 2009: 131). 
But Murphy argues that there is another strand of the American Jeremiad 
that employs ‘a more capacious use of the past’ to offer a more open and 
pluralistic understanding of America and its future. He suggests that we shift from 
empirical judgments to political ones, and from American values as a ‘model’ to 
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the ‘promise’ of American ideals. Murphy analyzes historical and contemporary 
examples of this progressive Jeremiad. Like Jürgen Habermas (1981) who 
argues that modernity is an incomplete project, Murphy (2009: 134) still has 
‘confidence in the emancipatory potential of American ideals’. 
This shift from ‘model’ to ‘promise’ is necessary for social as well as 
theoretical reasons: the traditional Jeremiad is based on what Bercovitch calls 
the ‘white Protestant consensus’ (Bercovitch 1978: 200). But Bercovitch’s 
personal experience is an example of how the ‘white Protestant consensus’ is no 
longer hegemonic in the US. As he repeatedly reminds us, Bercovitch is not an 
American, but a Jew from Canada whose parents were Communists. Even so, 
Bercovitch’s own career as an influential outsider who is accepted into the 
mainstream is an example of the American Dream. He was able to get a Chair at 
Harvard not in spite of his radical spirit that is critical of America, but because of 
it: ‘indeed, [my radical spirit] sharpened and expanded even as I thrived (only in 
America!) by making that outlook a mainstay of my academic career’ (2012: 11). 
While Bercovitch focuses on the limits of Americanism, Murphy (2009: 134) 
argues that since the normative politics of national belonging in the US has 
expanded to include non-white and non-Protestant groups, many in this new 
multicultural mainstream still see the ‘promise’ of the American Dream. 
‘Hamilton’, the wildly popular Broadway musical, celebrates such an open-ended, 
multicultural, multiethnic, multiracial American Dream (see Als 2015; Gopnik 
2016).  
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The China Dream, on the other hand, seems caught in ‘model’ paradigm 
(see Davies 2007; Bøckman 1998); political leaders and public intellectuals are 
transfixed with the task of probing the PRC’s twin traditions of neo-socialism and 
Chinese civilization, hoping to discover the correct model that will lead to national 
perfection (Zhonggong 2013; Tatlow 2014). Discursive politics is also quite 
different in the PRC, where the authoritarian state exercises broad powers of 
censorship that encourage self-censorship among public intellectuals (Davies 
2007: 2-7). Before it became official in late 2012, the China dream was invoked 
as a critical tool in debates about the normative politics of national belonging, 
which included a wide variety of critical interventions from both nativists and 
internationalists. But after Xi made the China Dream his official slogan in 
November 2012, it has been primarily employed by the party-state to mobilize 
support for the Xi’s narrow vision of national belonging in the PRC.  
National dreams thus are exemplary sites of the normative politics of 
national belonging. As this article has shown, belonging to the nation, in both 
China and the US, involves a nostalgic longing for the past as a model for the 
future. But it also seeks to avoid the meta-Jeremiad that apocalyptically 
denounces Americanism (and Chinese civilization) as dead-end discourses. 
Indeed, we need to take them seriously because both dreams can be used as 
discursive tools to critically evaluate the nation and the world. By using a 
poststructural approach to highlight the contingent nature of the normative 
politics of national belonging, the article follows Knott’s ‘Introduction’ to broaden 
our understanding of nationalism beyond issues of (often fixed notions of) of 
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identity and membership. It also follows the ‘Introduction’ to explore how 
self/Other performances of national dreams actually evoke normative discourse 
beyond the nation, which is still neither universalistic nor cosmopolitan: both 
national dreams have gone global. The China Dream and the American Dream 
thus are, at the same time, 1) familiar expressions of nationalism and national 
belonging, and 2) ongoing self/Other coherence-producing performances that 
help us to question received notions of nationalism and national belonging.  
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